Introduction
Traditionally, Germany has followed the male breadwinner model of the family (Krapf, 2014; Lewis, Knijn, Martin, & Ostner, 2008) . However, in the last decade the country has experienced radical policy changes in the areas of social, family and labour market policy (Eichhorst, Grienberger-Zingerle, & Konle-Seidl, 2010; Leitner, 2013; Seeleib-Kaiser & Fleckenstein, 2007) . Major labour market reforms introduced in 2005, known as Hartz IV, changed the conditions for receiving welfare benefits towards encouraging an adult-worker model of the family. All adult household members who are capable of working are expected to do so, irrespective of their prior household role (e.g., former homemaker).
Much emphasis has been placed on encouraging welfare benefit recipients' reintegration into employment. At the local level, this responsibility falls on case managers in Job centres, who can make use of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) to increase welfare benefit recipients' employment opportunities. These ALMPs include training programmes, job-creation schemes and job subsidies. Any adult member of a welfare recipient household can be assigned to these ALMPs, irrespective of his or her prior labour market participation. Whether the inherent potential for this policy to alter former household roles is realised depends on how policies are adapted at the local level.
This study investigated whether former genderspecific differences in women's labour market attachment compared with that of their partner are challenged or replicated by their participation in five different ALMPs for welfare benefit recipients after the Hartz IV reforms. We compared programme participation rates between women in former male breadwinner, no-earner, dual earner and female breadwinner households, categorised according to each partner's long-term prior cumulative earnings.
For our analyses, we used extensive longitudinal administrative data with daily information. We employed event-history analysis to study ALMP entry rates, distinguishing between eastern and western Germany.
The article is structured as follows. The next sections outline the institutional framework in Germany. Theoretical considerations from the literature follow, while the fifth section presents the research questions and the sixth discusses the data and the method of analysis. The seventh section, then, discusses the empirical findings. The final section concludes.
The German Hartz IV reforms in international comparison
A large-scale employment and welfare policy measure, known as the Hartz IV reforms, took place in Germany in 2005. This measure merged the former unemployment assistance and social assistance benefits to create Unemployment Benefit II (UB II) (Eichhorst et al., 2010) and introduced Social Code II as the legal basis (Sozialgesetzbuch II, 2015) . Thus, all persons who have run out of or are not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits, including former social assistance recipients capable of working, can apply for UB II. An important goal of the reforms is to reduce the level of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment. The Hartz reforms place unemployed persons under greater pressure to participate in activation activities and accept available job offers (Eichhorst et al., 2010) .
The Hartz IV reforms also entailed substantial administrative restructuring. Prior to the reform, municipalities were responsible for social assistance benefits, and the Federal Employment Agency administered unemployment insurance and assistance. Since 2005, the UB II's joint administration by the federal public employment service (PES) together with municipal welfare offices within Job centres is most common, while sole administration by municipal authorities or other organisational arrangements occurs in only a minority of districts (Eichhorst et al., 2010; Reis et al., 2008) .
This restructuring is mirrored in UB II recipients' access to ALMPs. Following the Hartz IV reforms, ALMPs initially reserved for unemployment insurance recipients became available to UB II recipients as well. Prior to the reforms, activation measures for social assistance recipients varied considerably between municipalities (Eichhorst et al., 2010) . Since 2005, the administration of activation measures has become increasingly standardised, although individual units in Job centres uphold a certain degree of creative leeway (Reis et al., 2008) .
Our study focuses on participation in the five most widely used German ALMPs for UB II recipients (Statistics Department of the German Public Employment Service, 2010): One-Euro-Jobs, short classroom training programmes, short in-firm training programmes, further vocational training and wage subsidies for employers and employees in private firms. Table 1 gives a brief overview of the content, participation rates and employment effects of these programmes.
Despite more universal activation efforts since the reforms, women participate in most ALMPs less often than men, especially in western Germany. This gender logic of activation with lower female participation rates has also been observed internationally (Cavaco, Fougère, & Pouget, 2013; Nybom, 2013) . Lower participation rates are not necessarily linked to lower employment effects, as seen in Table 1 , for example for One-Euro-Jobs. This article aims to provide more detailed knowledge on women's programme participation patterns by taking the household context into account.
The greater emphasis placed on activation since the Hartz reforms reflects OECD recommendations and related goals formulated in the European Employment Strategy (EES) (see Dingeldey, 2007; Pfister, 2008) . In 1990, the OECD recommended increasing women's integration in the labour market as a means of combatting poverty, dependency and social exclusion (Dingeldey, 2007) . Particularly since the 2000 Lisbon Strategy, the EES has likewise emphasised the activation of the previously inactive, especially women, older persons and disabled persons (Annesley, 2007; Lewis & Giullari, 2005) . Annesley (2007) argued that a development towards a common Europe-wide adult worker social model has indeed occurred. Betzelt and Bothfeld (2011) maintained that activation policies are the pathway by which these EU employment objectives are translated to the national level. In the German context, this notion becomes evident in that the first paragraph of the German Social Code II, the law regulating conditions for UB II receipt, calls for equal treatment of men and women receiving UB II. Moreover, the second paragraph of the German Social Code II states that each adult member of an UB II recipient household who is capable of working is expected to help enable the household to exit UB II receipt or at least to reduce the level of the household's benefit dependency (Sozialgesetzbuch II, 2015) . These members include partners of the formerly employed, even those who had not previously participated in the labour market themselves. These members are now likewise obliged to search for jobs or to participate in ALMPs.
Although the manner in which activation policies are implemented is unclear a priori, concern has been voiced that these policies would lead to interference in couples' private decisions concerning their division Jaehrling, 2012) . For instance, Spindler (2003) criticised these reforms for enforcing the adult worker model of the family and separating parents from their children.
Social policy reforms in other countries likewise show evidence of an at least partial reorientation towards the adult worker model of the family. Daly (2011) , Lewis and Giullari (2005) and Ingold and Etherington (2013) provided overviews and an indepth discussion of reforms in various countries. One well-known example is the UK, where a series of welfare-to-work programmes was initiated in the late 1990s. Among these, the New Deal for Partners, introduced in 1999, particularly aimed at activating partnered women who previously did not participate in the labour market. This programme offered work counselling for spouses of the unemployed (Ingold & Etherington, 2013) . The introduction of Joint Claims for Jobseeker's Allowance followed in 2001, which considers both partners to be available for work.
This reorientation of social policy towards the adult worker model of the family in many countries has been internationally criticised by feminist welfare state research for generally assuming that everyone can be economically self-sufficient and for not taking care responsibilities into account (Fraser, 1994; Lewis, 2006; Ostner, 2004) .
Reorientation of policies in Germany towards an adult worker model has only begun to occur in recent (Bernhard, Gartner, & Stephan, 2008) years. This also becomes apparent with respect to family policy, particularly in western Germany. The next section describes past and current family policy developments in eastern and western Germany.
Family policies and gender role attitudes in eastern and western Germany
Policies in the former West Germany (before unification) tended to support the male breadwinner model of the family. Income tax regulations provided large advantages for married one-earner couples and couples with unequal earnings (Krapf, 2014; Lewis et al., 2008) . In addition, non-employed spouses could obtain health insurance free from additional costs via their partner's employment. Moreover, for couples with children, the low level of public childcare provision in the former West Germany made it difficult for both parents to be employed (Leitner, 2013; Morel, 2008) . In the former East Germany (before unification), on the other hand, policies supported or even enforced an adult worker model of the family. Extensive childcare was provided, and long workweeks were the norm for all adults. In 1989, East Germany had the highest official female employment rate in the world, at 89% (Rosenfeld, Trappe, & Gornick, 2004) .
While the former West German tax and health insurance systems now apply to both parts of Germany, large differences remain with respect to childcare infrastructure, despite significant increases in childcare provision, especially in western Germany, in the last decade (Leitner, 2013; Morel, 2008) . In 2015, overall (full-time) childcare attendance rates for children up to two years of age were 52% (40) in eastern Germany and 28% (13) in western Germany. Of children aged three to six, 97% (74) in eastern Germany and 95% (39) in western Germany attended kindergarten (full-time) (Statistische € Amter des Bundes und der L€ ander, 2016).
Policy settings and actual levels of female employment often interact with societal attitudes towards gender roles (Kroska & Elman, 2009; Pfau-Effinger, 2004) . During the study period, eastern Germans held more egalitarian attitudes towards gender roles than did western Germans. Based on Eurobarometer data, Scheuer and Dittmann (2007) showed that 53% of western Germans -compared with only 20% of eastern Germans -favoured a traditional division of labour in the household in 2006.
Theoretical considerations and previous qualitative findings on the activation of couples receiving UB II
In this section, we discuss various factors that could influence the outcome of the activation process, including incentive structures set by policy makers, gender role attitudes held by both benefit recipients and case managers, and case managers' discretion, which can often act as a mediating factor. Lipsky (1980) argued that front-line public service agents, referred to as street-level bureaucrats, will inevitably exercise discretion. However, he also maintained that this implies that the achievement of policy goals is at stake. By contrast, more recent studies on street-level bureaucracy have emphasised that discretion is necessary for public service agents to successfully attend to citizens' needs as professionals in a given field (Evans, 2011) . Instruments such as performance indicators that enable close monitoring of the achievements of public service agents, however, have the potential to curtail discretion (Hj€ orne, Juhila, & van Nijnatten, 2010; McDonald, 2006) .
In Germany, Job centres' effectiveness is measured via performance indicators, for instance the number of benefit recipients placed in employment and the reduction of spending on unemployment benefits (Jacobi & Kluve, 2007; Sch€ utz, 2009) . At the same time, case managers' discretion in deciding how to improve benefit recipients' employability is explicitly encouraged (Bartelheimer, 2005) .
Qualitative findings reported by Jaehrling (2015) point at important factors in case managers' strategies and use of discretion, especially for the activation of mothers. Interviews with case managers and UB II recipients with children were conducted in ten Job centres in eastern and western Germany from January to June 2008. Findings were that, in the case of couples (especially parents) receiving UB II, case managers generally first attempted to place the male partner in employment and did not enforce the activation of both partners at the same time.
The interviews with the case managers helped identify a number of reasons for this strategy (Jaehrling, 2015) . Performance goals can set incentives to focus activation efforts on the male partner. If case managers believed the male partner's employment chances to be more promising, they were likely to choose to invest in the partner's over the woman's employability in order to enable the household to exit benefit receipt (Jaehrling, 2015) .
Moreover, some case managers did not want to interfere in the couples' previous division of labour in the household and wished to respect their personal choices in this respect. In one exemplary case, the influence of the case manager's adherence to the oneearner family model became evident.
In general, the case managers' gender role attitudes were reportedly more egalitarian in eastern Germany than in western Germany (Jaehrling, 2015) . This finding is in line with the literature on attitudes in the general population in eastern and western Germany (Scheuer & Dittmann, 2007) . Nevertheless, labour market integration efforts also were found to focus on the male partner in eastern Germany. A reason that was given for this was that mothers were more difficult to place in employment than fathers in the challenging eastern German labour market. Only in a few instances did the case managers report attempting to reverse couples' previous division of labour in the household.
A further difference between eastern and western Germany relates to the professional experience of case managers, as the social assistance tradition is weaker in eastern Germany and case managers are therefore less experienced with social assistance. However, the social assistance regime before 2005 had clearly defined rules for the activation of women with children (assuming a part-time [full-time] job to be reasonable as soon as the youngest child turned eight [15] years old). This rule was eliminated by the Hartz reforms, and the decision is now left to the discretion of caseworkers. Nevertheless, it seems conceivable that caseworkers whose professional experience extends to the old social assistance regime will remember the old rules. Therefore, differences in the exercise of discretion and in the activation of women in eastern and western Germany can be expected (Jaehrling, 2015) .
Thus, altogether, assignment of UB II recipients to activation programmes in practice depends on a large number of factors, including incentive structures set by policy makers, initiatives at the level of individual Job centres, gender role attitudes held by both case managers and benefit recipients, and the varying experiences of case managers.
To our knowledge, the study by Jaehrling (2015) is unique in its inclusion of case managers' gender attitudes as a factor in the activation process. Nonetheless, general evidence on the importance of case managers' individual activation strategies for their clients' employment chances is provided by a number of international studies (e.g., Behncke, Fr€ olich, & Lechner, 2010; Lagerstr€ om, 2011; Weatherall & Markwardt, 2010) and specifically for Germany by Boockmann, Osiander, and Stops (2015) , Ludwig-Mayerhofer, Behrend, and Sondermann (2008) and Osiander and Steinke (2011) . Thus, it seems plausible that, next to structural factors such as systems of performance indicators, case managers' individual strategies can additionally influence the activation process to a certain extent.
In our empirical analyses, we offer representative results on the outcome of the assignment process in the Job centres for women with varying degrees of prior labour market attachment relative to their partner. While Jaehrling's (2015) findings give insight into the activation process, they are not necessarily representative. Our analysis adds to the overall picture because we took unemployed persons in all Job centres into account. We did not intend to disentangle the different mechanisms by which the policy framework may be translated into practical implementations. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of the different possible causal mechanisms. This study, which used representative large-scale data, is the first to demonstrate the extent to which women's former labour market attachment relative to their partner has been, in fact, replicated or disregarded in assignments to activation programmes.
Research questions
We formulated research questions for women living in four different household types. Their definition and the data used for their operationalization are described in more detail in the data and methods section. Briefly, we used an interaction between women's and their partner's cumulative earnings across the ten years prior to becoming unemployed benefit recipients. We categorised households according to the division of labour ensuing from each partner preserving the degree of labour market attachment that he/she exhibited in the past. Thus, we differentiated between no breadwinner households, male breadwinner households, dual earner households and female breadwinner households.
Our first hypothesis was that ALMP entry rates would be lower for women with a partner than for single women (Hypothesis 1). Previous qualitative findings (Jaehrling, 2015) indicated that case managers often presuppose a traditional division of labour in couple households. Benefit recipients' own preferences, as well as pressure to fulfil performance goals if the male partner's employment chances are perceived to be greater, may also influence this decision. We differentiated four pairs of comparisons: women from former no breadwinner or male breadwinner households compared with single women with low prior earnings, and women from former dual earner or female breadwinner households compared with single women with formerly higher earnings. In each comparison, we kept women's own earnings constant, to account for an independent earnings effect.
In the second hypothesis, we differentiated Hypothesis 1 for eastern and western Germany. As discussed in the policy background section, the different historical trajectories in eastern and western Germany are reflected in differences in attitudes concerning the division of labour in the household that still persist today. We expected that benefit recipients' and case managers' own attitudes influence their behaviour and that case managers exercise discretion in different ways in eastern and western Germany. Additionally, the childcare infrastructure and, therefore, women's opportunities to work or to be activated differ between these regions. Moreover, the greater influence of the social assistance tradition in western Germany may also influence the usage of discretion and lead to differences from eastern Germany. For all these reasons, our second hypothesis was that the differences between singles and women with a partner would be smaller in eastern than in western Germany (Hypothesis 2).
In the third hypothesis, we went further and distinguished partnered women with different former divisions of labour in the household. We hypothesised that the former division of labour in the household would be reflected in women's assignments to ALMPs. As indicated by Jaehrling (2015) , this may be the case either because case managers take their clients' attitudes into account and respect their former division of work or because this best enables Job centres to fulfil their performance goals. We hypothesised that women in former male breadwinner households would have lower entry rates into ALMPs than women in low-earning households without an apparent former division of labour (no breadwinner households). Moreover, women in former female breadwinner households would have higher entry rates into ALMPs than women in former dual earner households (Hypothesis 3).
We differentiated this hypothesis for eastern and western Germany as well. We expected that women's former relative labour market attachment would be reflected less strongly in their assignments to ALMPs in eastern than in western Germany. Since attitudes towards the one-earner family model differ between eastern and western Germany and lower childcare availability in western Germany can make it difficult for couples to change their division of labour in the short term, we expected previous breadwinner arrangements to more strongly be reflected in women's ALMP participation rates in western than in eastern Germany (Hypothesis 4).
Finally, we expected different results for the different types of ALMPs. As described in Table 1 , in-firm training programmes and job subsidies are especially effective in raising participants' subsequent chances of regular employment. Thus, case managers might particularly target assignments to these programmes towards persons they perceive to be potential breadwinners, as a strategy to fulfil performance goals as well as in reflection of their own and/or benefit recipients' gender attitudes. Moreover, these are comparatively small programmes in terms of overall participation numbers (Table 1) , which may make participation particularly selective in favour of potential breadwinners. We therefore hypothesised that the differences between singles and women with a partner that we generally expected for all ALMPs (see Hypotheses 1 and 2) would be especially large for job subsidies and in-firm training programmes (Hypothesis 5a). Furthermore, the differences between the household types for women with a partner (see Hypotheses 3 and 4) were likewise expected to be particularly large for job subsidies and in-firm training programmes (Hypothesis 5b).
Data and method
This study used large-scale administrative data originating from employment offices and from notifications sent by employers to health and pension insurance funds. Longitudinal data on spells of employment, unemployment, benefit receipt and programme participation were extracted from these sources and made available for scientific analysis in the form of the Integrated Employment Biography data set and the UB II History data set (Dorner, Heining, Jacobebbinghaus, & Seth, 2010).
Our study sample consisted of women who were living alone or with a partner and/or children and who entered into a state of UB II receipt without employment at any time between 1 October 2005 and 31 December 2007. We further limited our sample to the age range 30-64 because our analyses took sample members' employment history across the last ten years into account. The observation window ended in December 2008. For comparability reasons, the sample covered districts with joint administration of UB II by the PES and municipal welfare offices only. Thus, the 13% of unemployed UB II recipients registered in districts in which UB II is solely administered by local authorities were excluded.
We employed event-history analysis to estimate sample members' entry rates into ALMPs. For each sample member, we included the first spell in which they were receiving UB II and were not employed starting between 1 October 2005 and 31 December 2007. Spells were censored when sample members entered employment, stopped receiving UB II, or reached age 65, or on 31 December 2008. The spell durations were measured in days. The models were piece-wise constant exponential models, and are generally represented by the following formula:
The log hazard of programme entry is given by lnh i (t). We estimated separate models for entries into each of five different types of ALMPs. These included One-Euro-Jobs, classroom training programmes, in-firm training programmes, further vocational training, and job subsidies. The log baseline hazard is represented by y(t). It was specified as piece-wise constant for the time segments 0-3, 3-6, 6-12, 12-18, 18-24, 24-30, 30-36 and over 36 months after spell start. The independent variables in the model are represented by x ij (t). The individual-level error term is represented by e i . In the models, unobserved heterogeneity was controlled for by explicitly estimating the distribution of the individual-level error term, for which a gamma distribution was assumed.
As described above, our main independent variable of interest was the couple's relative labour market attachment prior to the start of the spell of benefit receipt without employment. Couples did not necessarily need to have been living together for the entire ten years. Nevertheless, we expected each partner's employment experience and earnings to have strongly influenced his or her expectations concerning the future division of labour in the household. Drawing on the Integrated Employment Biography data described above, we operationalized partners' prior relative labour market attachment by including an interaction between a woman's cumulative earnings and those of her partner across the ten years preceding the spell start. Using such a long time span can be advantageous, given the sample members' irregular employment careers. To specify the household category variable, we calculated the common median over the cumulative individual earnings of women and their partners across the last ten years. Earnings were deflated to 2005 price levels, and the median of the 10-year cumulative gross individual earnings for men and women in couples was 38,589 Euros. The median of 38,589 Euros thus applied to women's and to men's individual earnings. We employed this median to categorise persons as having past cumulative earnings below or above the median.
We included single women in our analyses for comparison purposes. Thus, we distinguished between the following household types: single women with belowmedian cumulative earnings over the last ten years, no breadwinner couples (both the man and the woman had cumulative earnings below the median across the last ten years), male breadwinner couples (the man had above-median and the woman below-median cumulative earnings), single women with above-median cumulative earnings, female breadwinner households (the woman had above-median and the man below-median cumulative earnings) and dual breadwinner households (both the man and the woman had abovemedian cumulative earnings).
We included a number of control variables in our models, as seen in Tables 3 and 4 . Descriptive statistics for selected control variables are shown in Table 2 . 
Results
First, we present the results for western Germany (Table 3 ). To test Hypothesis 1, we chose as the reference categories single women with below-median and above-median earnings, respectively. The findings showed that irrespective of couple household type, ALMP entry rates were always lower for women with a partner than for single women, supporting our first hypothesis. Compared with single women with below-median former earnings, entry rates into One-Euro-Jobs were only 71% as high for women from no breadwinner households (both partners with below-median earnings) ( Table 3 ). The differences between the two groups were greatest for in-firm training programmes and job subsidies, supporting Hypothesis 5a. In the case of job subsidies, entry rates for women from former no breadwinner households were only 43% as high as those of formerly below-median-earning single women. The difference between women in former male breadwinner households and formerly below-median-earning singles was even larger. For instance, entry rates into One-Euro-Jobs were only 55% as high for women in former male breadwinner households as for singles with former earnings below the median, and entry rates into in-firm training programmes and job subsidies were only 38 and 39% as high, respectively.
Among women with former earnings above the median in western Germany, ALMP entry rates for those with a partner were also lower than for singles (Table 3) . Former female breadwinners had ALMP entry rates ranging between 58 and 79% the level of single women. Comparing single women to women in former dual earner households, the difference was at least as large. In each of our four comparisons for western Germany, then, programme entry rates were lower for women with a partner than for single women. This was the case not only for women in former male breadwinner households, but also for households without a clear former division of labour or even female breadwinner households. Therefore, our results supported Hypothesis 1 for western Germany.
In eastern Germany, the effect of having a partner was also highly significant in almost all cases (Table  4 ). The effects were smaller than for western Germany, supporting Hypothesis 2. For eastern Germany, Hypothesis 5a on differences in effects between the different types of ALMPs was supported only for the comparison between single women and those in former no breadwinner households.
For western Germany, the results for comparisons among couple households supported the third hypothesis, that women's assignments to ALMPs reflect couples' former division of labour. Women in former male breadwinner households were less often assigned to ALMPs than were women in households without a former breadwinner (Table 3) .
Further significance tests (not shown here) indicated that in the cases of One-Euro-Jobs, classroom training programmes, in-firm training programmes and further vocational training, differences in programme entry rates between western German women in former male breadwinner households and no breadwinner households were significant. Concerning the size of these effects, programme entry rates were 70-76% as high for women in former male breadwinner households as for women in former no breadwinner households. Job subsidies were the exception, with a non-significant effect.
Partners' earnings were not quite as relevant for programme assignments of women with relatively higher earnings in the last ten years. In western Germany, women in former dual earner households were assigned to several of the ALMPs at somewhat lower rates than women in former female breadwinner households (Table 3 ), but the difference was smaller than that for male breadwinner to no breadwinner households, and further analyses showed that these differences were not always significant. This may be because female breadwinner households find somewhat less normative acceptance than male breadwinner households. Altogether, these findings for western Germany provided partial support for Hypothesis 3.
For western Germany, Hypothesis 5b on differences between ALMPs was not supported. Case managers generally replicated women's former labour market attachment relative to their partner in assignments to all ALMPs, but this effect was not systematically greater for in-firm training programmes and job subsidies than for the other ALMPs.
Turning to eastern Germany, the findings differed from those for western Germany (Table 4) . For eastern Germany, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Entry rates into ALMPs were not generally lower for women in former male breadwinner households than for those in former no breadwinner households. In fact, entry rates into all programmes except further vocational training were actually slightly higher for women in male breadwinner than in no breadwinner households (Table 4) .
Entry rates were also slightly higher for women in former dual earner households than in female breadwinner households in eastern Germany. Thus, in the majority of cases in eastern Germany, partners' former relative labour market attachment was not replicated or was even challenged by assignments to ALMPs. This result was further corroborated by the finding that differences in participation rates between the household types were largest for in-firm training programmes and job subsidies, in the opposite direction as hypothesised in Hypothesis 5b. Thus, case managers in eastern Germany seem to be making particularly strong use of these specific types of ALMPs, which are especially effective in improving participants' employment chances (Table 1) , for women with low labour market attachment relative to their partners. Altogether, our findings supported Hypothesis 4 that partners' former relative labour market attachment would tend to be reflected in women's ALMP participation more strongly in western than in eastern Germany.
In addition to highlighting the influence of the household category variables, Tables 3 and 4 also show the results for the control variables. Their influence was mostly as expected. The number of children had a negative effect on entries into ALMPs, and the age of the youngest child had a positive effect. These effects were stronger in western than in eastern Germany. Older sample members were less likely to take part in ALMPs. The level of education tended to have a positive effect, although this effect reversed slightly for those with the highest level of education. Having basic educational credentials may be seen as a precondition for participating in many ALMPs, while those with higher educational degrees may be considered to be somewhat less in need of further qualification via ALMPs. Persons without German citizenship had lower entry rates into ALMPs. Entry rates into ALMPs were also lower for persons with disabilities or health impairments. We ran several additional estimations using alternative model specifications to test the robustness of our findings. These results are available from the authors on request. First, we ran an additional model using cumulative earnings across the previous five years to test if the results are sensitive to the time period considered. The results were very similar to our original findings.
Second, we ran a robustness check alternatively using cumulative employment experience for the household type definition and a further check using average earnings while employed. Both estimates gave results very similar to our original ones. Thus, our findings seem to be very robust to alterations in the specification of household categories.
Furthermore, we ran additional analyses where we first limited the sample to childless women and then to mothers of young children aged three to five (mothers of children aged zero to two are usually exempt from ALMP assignments). The results were very similar to those for the complete sample. In additional analyses, to make the eastern and western German samples more comparable, we reduced the sample to persons with German citizenship and with an educational degree. The results were again qualitatively the same.
To enable direct comparisons with single women, our original models did not control for further partner characteristics. In additional models, such controls did not alter the results for western Germany. For eastern Germany, the tendency for the partner's cumulative earnings history to be positively related to women's ALMP entry rates was mirrored and partly explained by positive effects of the partner's current employment and earnings.
Conclusion
In this study, we investigated women's participation rates in the most widely used German ALMPs for UB II recipients. The formal conditions for benefit receipt have the potential to challenge traditional patterns of divisions of labour in the household. Even women who formerly did not participate in the labour market may be required to prepare for employment if their household becomes dependent on means-tested unemployment benefits. However, the outcome of the assignment process depends on various factors, for example incentive structures set by policy makers, initiatives at the level of individual Job centres, gender role attitudes held by both case managers and benefit recipients, and the varying experiences of case managers, who have discretion concerning activation decisions.
We categorised households to determine whether women's former labour market attachment relative to their partner is replicated or challenged in practice. We operationalized women's former relative labour market attachment via their own and their partner's cumulative earnings across the ten years prior to entering the status of unemployed benefit recipient. We assumed that the results would give insight into prevalent patterns of activation in that we covered the five most widely used German ALMPs. Moreover, they represent a broad spectrum of activation programmes.
For western Germany, we found that ALMP participations replicated, rather than challenged, women's previous labour market attachment relative to their partner, supporting one of our main hypotheses. Women in male breadwinner households had lower ALMP entry rates than women in households without a clear former division of labour. Previous qualitative research indicated that case managers wish to respect couples' private choices regarding the division of labour in the household. A further explanation may be that case managers focus their activation efforts on the member of the couple whose chances of obtaining a higher-paying job are better to begin with due to pressure to meet performance goals. We did not intend to separate these different possible causal mechanisms but instead aimed to provide representative results on the outcome of this process, which have not been available to date.
Replication of women's prior relative labour market attachment may be seen positively in that couples receiving means-tested benefits in practice retain the freedom to choose their household roles despite official policy guidelines stipulating the contrary.
On the other hand, our findings for western Germany also indicate that a large group of women with little employment experience may have fewer opportunities to improve their employment chances via ALMPs. Some women in former male breadwinner households may wish to profit from these opportunities but are denied access to ALMPs in practice. These considerations on positive and negative implications of replications of household roles in the activation process do not apply to eastern Germany to the same extent.
In eastern Germany, ALMP participation rates were sometimes actually higher for women in former male breadwinner households than for those in households without a clear former division of labour. One explanation may be that, as a result of more egalitarian societal gender role attitudes that prevail even today, a former homemaker role is not as frequently accepted in eastern Germany as a reason to be exempted from activation programmes. A more extensive childcare infrastructure is likely to be a further important factor. Moreover, the more difficult labour market situation in eastern Germany should hamper the success of the strategy of concentrating activation efforts solely on the male partner. Furthermore, due to higher overall participation rates, assignments especially to One-Euro-Jobs may have generally been less selective in eastern than in western Germany.
Based on formal policy regulations, persons receiving UB II could be indiscriminately allocated to activation programmes, independent of the household type or household roles to which they have become accustomed. Our findings show, however, that in western Germany, prior household roles are replicated in activation programme participations. The differences that we find between eastern and western Germany reflect the many differences in the labour market, institutional and normative context that persists between the two parts of the country.
Our analyses have concentrated on women's ALMP participation. Future research could also study the relevance of the household context for men's participation.
